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I. INTRODUCTION
The cost of doing business in the United States has increased significantly
with the advent of environmental protection laws and regulations. Federal,
state, and local governments are continually strengthening the laws and
regulations that protect the environment.1 For example, a Washington Post
article from 2013 reported that in the prior year “[t]he federal government
imposed an estimated $216 billion in regulatory costs on the economy . . . .”2
The article further noted that three-fourths of those costs were driven by two
environmental rules that set new fuel economy standards for cars and trucks,
and limited mercury emissions from power plants fueled by coal and oil.3
Environmental regulators and advocacy groups publicize numerous benefits
of environmental regulations.4 Regardless, the cost-burden of compliance
rests on the business community. For instance, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) has promulgated extensive rules for mitigating
wetland impacts.5 These mitigation requirements result in significant costs
to real estate developers. Yet, that is only a snapshot of the compliance side
† H.Wayne Cecil is a Professor of Accounting at the Lutgert College of Business, Florida
Gulf Coast University. Dr. Cecil teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in taxation.
He conducts research in taxpayer compliance. Dr. Cecil has eight years of applied
business experience with international accounting firms.
1. See generally Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1275 (2018) (codifying laws
to prevent water pollution); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
6901–6908 (2018) (governing federal law relating to safe disposal of solid waste); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2018) (controlling air quality); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675
(2018) (regulating cleanup sites where hazardous material was spilled).
2. Jim Tankersley, New Regulations Cost $216B and 87 Million Hours of




4. See id. (noting government calculations that demonstrate “lives saved and
improvements in public health”).
5. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.91–230.98 (2008) (detailing the EPA’s purpose
and general duties).
2020 MONETARY CONSEQUENCES OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 125
of the equation.
Businesses not meeting the requirements of environmental laws and
regulations are liable for damages to the impacted natural resources and are
increasingly being assessed larger penalties and fines. The government
seeking indemnification from the alleged violator for Natural Resource
Damages (“NRD”) is one potential consequence of non-compliance.6
Several laws establish the authority of Natural Resource Trustees7 to
negotiate with Potentially Responsible Parties (“PRP”) to obtain PRP-
financed or PRP-conducted assessment and restoration of a natural resource
injury, to sue PRPs for the costs of assessing and restoring the natural
resource, or to conduct the assessment themselves and seek reimbursement
from the PRPs.8
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) is the leading federal law governing NRD
compliance.9 CERCLA does not provide an express standard for measuring
NRD but defines the term “damages” as “damages [payable in money] for
injury or loss of natural resources . . . .”10 The regulations provide that the
measure of damages is the cost of restoring injured resources to their baseline
condition, compensation for the interim loss of injured resources pending
recovery, and the reasonable cost of a damage assessment.11 While not
defining the measure of damages, CERCLA provides that “the measure of
damages . . . shall not be limited by the sums which can be used to restore or
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(5) (“[A]n action under section 9607 of this title for
recovery of such indemnification payment from a potentially responsible party may be
brought at any time before the expiration of 3 years from the date on which such payment
is made.”).
7. See id. § 9604(b)(2).
8. See 33 U.S.C. § 1268(a)(3)(L) (2018) (defining “responsible party” as “an
individual or entity that may be liable under any Federal or State authority that is being
used or may be used to facilitate the cleanup and protection of the Great Lakes”); 42
U.S.C. § 9622(c)(1) (describing conditions for when a potentially responsible party is
liable); id. § 9601 (stating objective to provide redress for environmental claims); 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (attempting to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the nation’s waters); Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 2701 (2018) (providing redress for oil-related environmental claims).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9628.
10. Id. § 9601(6); see also id. § 9607(a) (defining covered persons, scope,
recoverable costs and damages, interest rate; and comparable maturity date); id.
§ 9611(b)(2) (defining limitations on payment for natural resource claims and peripheral
matters).
11. 43 C.F.R. § 11.15 (2018); see 15 C.F.R. § 990.52 (2018) (emphasizing that
“trustees must quantify the degree, and spatial and temporal extent of such injuries
relative to baseline”); 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d) (highlighting that the “measure of natural
resource damages” includes “the cost of restoring . . . or acquiring the equivalent
[resource], . . . the diminution in value,” and the reasonable cost of assessment).
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replace such resources.”12 Trustees may also recover the “reasonable costs”
of assessing natural resource damages and any prejudgment interest.13 Thus,
at a minimum, a trustee may seek to recover the costs of restoration,
replacement, or acquiring the equivalent of the affected resource, the lost use
and non-use values of the natural resource from the time of the injury until
restoration, and the reasonable costs of assessing damages.14
In light of the current regulatory climate, this Article analyzes the federal
income tax consequences to businesses for compliance, or non-compliance,
with environmental regulation. A threshold question is whether the cost or
expense of complying with environmental regulations or resolving alleged
violations is considered a cost of doing business, restoration of damage, or a
penalty or fine. To frame the analysis, it is helpful to begin by discussing
the various categories of environmental regulatory costs that are commonly
imputed on businesses.
II. CATEGORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY COSTS
A. Environmental Permits
There may be significant costs associated with preparing and submitting
applications for environmental permits. This often includes the need to
engage a variety of experts such as engineers, botanists, toxicologists, fish
and wildlife experts, hydrologists, geologists, hydrogeologists, and wetlands
experts. The permit application process may require responding to requests
for additional information from the regulatory authority and engaging in a
lengthy negotiation process that ultimately leads to the issuance or denial of
a permit. For example, on the federal level, the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”),15 within the Clean Water Act (“CWA”),
requires a permit prior to the discharge of pollutants from a point source into
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1); see United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d
711, 722 (2d Cir. 1993) (reasoning that a defendant may escape liability for money
damages “if it either succeeds in proving” that its conduct “did not contribute to the
release” and subsequent damages, or that it contributed “only a divisible portion of the
harm” at most); see also New York v. Lashins Arcade Co., 881 F. Supp. 101, 102–03
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining that the Act’s minutely limited liability is “essentially
tortious in nature” because a defendant establishes a defense by proving, “by a
preponderance of the evidence,” that a third party’s act or omission, other than an
employee or agent, caused “the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance” and
its subsequent damages).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d).
14. Id.
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2018).
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waters of the United States.16 An NPDES permit imposes limits on the
composition of the discharge, monitoring and reporting requirements, and
other provisions to protect water quality and human health.17 According to
the EPA, “the permit translates general requirements of the Clean Water Act
into specific provisions tailored to the operations of each person discharging
pollutants.”18 The EPA has implemented NPDES permitting through its
regulatory program.19 The CWA also provides for delegation to the states.20
If the agency denies the permit, the applicant may then challenge the
denial in an administrative hearing and, subsequently, in an appellate court.21
Litigating a permit denial greatly increases the cost to the applicant.22 For
instance, in Florida, an applicant who is denied a permit may file a petition
for a formal administrative hearing.23 Proceeding through the administrative
process is usually required prior to seeking redress in court due to the
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.24 The U.S. Supreme
Court has addressed this long-established judicial doctrine, stating that it
assures that “no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed threat or injury
16. See id. § 1342(f) (stating that administrator shall establish categories of point
sources).
17. Id. § 1342(o)(2)(4).
18. NPDES Permit Basics, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-
basics (last visited May 20, 2020) (defining an NPDES permit).
19. 40 C.F.R § 122.1(a) (2018).
20. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
21. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.68 (West 2019); see also id. § 120.569.
22. See id. § 120.569.
23. See id.
24. See Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 792 So.
2d 539, 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that the limited exceptions to the
exhaustion doctrine include: (1) no adequate administrative remedy exists; (2) an agency
is acting without authority and clearly in excess of its legislatively delegated powers; or
(3) to invoke the power of the circuit court to decide constitutional issues). Additionally,
it should be noted that certain statutes may provide an exception to the general rule. For
instance, section 72.011(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides, in part: “A taxpayer may
contest the legality of any assessment or denial of refund of tax, fee, surcharge, permit,
interest, or penalty provided for under . . . [certain specified sections of the Florida
Statutes] . . . by filing an action in circuit court; or, alternatively, the taxpayer may file a
petition under the applicable provisions of [Ch.] 120.” FLA. STAT. § 72.011(1)(a) (2019);
see also JES Publ’g Corp. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 730 So. 2d 854, 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that JES had the option to file in circuit court or request an
evidentiary hearing from the DOR to prove additional facts needed for its argument
regarding a tax issue); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§120.569(1), 120.68; id. §373.114 (regarding
appeals to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110
(2019) (outlining the applicability of the rule to administrative actions, orders of review
for a new trial, and appellate jurisdiction).
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until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.”25 The state
of Texas has codified the concept.26 Disappointed permit applicants often
find the process exhausting.
B. Wetland Mitigation
If a real estate development plan displaces wetlands, mitigation becomes
a part of the environmental permit negotiation process.27 Mitigation may be
accomplished by creating a new wetland from uplands, enhancing an
existing wetland, or preserving an existing wetland through the use of
instruments such as a conservation easement.28 The mitigation may be
accomplished offsite and could result in additional costs. 29 A regulatory
agency may insist on a ratio of wetlands created, enhanced, or preserved to
compensate for impacted wetlands;30 such that it is cost-prohibitive, and the
development may no longer be financially feasible. At a minimum, the
process of obtaining approval of a mitigation plan can be costly and
complicated.31
C. Enforcement
Whether intentionally or inadvertently, a real estate developer may start
construction without a permit in violation of environmental laws or
regulations. In this scenario, mitigation comes into the picture from the
perspective of restoring damage to the environment. The negotiation process
is similar to that of permitting, except that the regulatory agency may seek a
higher ratio of created, enhanced, or preserved wetlands.32 Generally, when
25. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–52 (1938) (holding
that the district court could not enjoin the NLRB from holding a hearing regarding a
union complaint alleging unfair labor practices).
26. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.171 (West 2019) (“A person who has
exhausted all administrative remedies available within a state agency and who is
aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this
chapter.”).
27. 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.91, 230.92 (2019).
28. See id. § 230.93(c)(2)(iv).
29. See id. § 230.93(b)(6).
30. Id.
31. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 62–345.100(1) (2016) (detailing the
requirements for mitigation proposals).
32. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 230.93 (stating compensatory mitigation may be
performed using “methods of restoration, enhancement, establishment, and, in certain
circumstances, preservation”), with FLA. STAT. ANN. §373.414(18) (West 2019)
(requiring the establishment of a uniform mitigation assessment method “to determine
the amount of mitigation needed to offset adverse impacts to wetlands and other surface
waters and to award and deduct mitigation bank credits”).
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it comes to violations of environmental laws, the greater the environmental
harm and deviation from the regulatory requirements, the larger the penalty
that may be assessed.33
D. Natural Resource Damages
In cases involving NRD, the government is seeking indemnification from
the alleged violator for damage to the natural resources.34 Several U.S.
federal environmental laws establish the authority of Natural Resource
Trustees to negotiate with PRPs to obtain PRP-financed or PRP-conducted
assessment and restoration of a natural resource injury, to sue PRPs for the
costs of assessing and restoring the natural resource, or to conduct the
assessment themselves and seek reimbursement from the PRPs.35
E. Penalties and Fines
i. Consent Orders and Consent Decrees
When a respondent reaches an agreement with the regulatory agency to
resolve an alleged violation, the settlement agreement is embodied in a
Consent Order or a Consent Decree.36 A Consent Order is an administrative
order executed by both the enforcement agency and the respondent.37 A
Consent Decree is similar except that it is a judicial order approving the
settlement.38 For example, in August 2018, Southern California Gas
Company agreed to a $119.5 million settlement for the Aliso Canyon
methane leak.39 At that time, it was the biggest action that dealt with the
33. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9609(a)(3) (2018).
34. See id. § 9607 (“[L]iability shall be to the United States Government and to any
State for natural resources within the State or belonging to, managed by, controlled by,
or appertaining to such State . . . .”); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (2018) (“The President, or
the authorized representative of any State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of
the natural resources to recover for the costs of replacing or restoring such resources.”);
Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2018) (“[E]ach party
responsible . . . is liable for the removal costs and damages specified . . . that result from
such incident.”).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5); 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
36. See 40 C.F.R. § 209.19 (2019); FLA. ADMIN. CODEANN. R. 40E–1.711(2).
37. See 40 C.F.R. § 209.19(b).
38. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 589 (Thomas F.
P. Sullivan ed., 21st ed., 2011) (“The difference between the two forms of agreement is
that a consent decree is filed with and signed by a federal court, while a consent order
does not involve any judicial action.”).
39. See Tony Barboza, SoCal Gas Agrees to $119.5-Million Settlement for Aliso
Canyon Methane Leak – Biggest in U.S. History, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2018, 9:50 AM),
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health effects and climate damage of the largest release of methane in U.S.
history.40
ii. Final Orders and Judgments
While a vast majority of enforcement cases are settled, some are litigated,
resulting in a final order of an agency or a judgment of a court.41 These
orders and judgments are imposed rather than mutually agreed upon.42 For
example, on April 1, 2019, the North Carolina Department of Environmental
Quality ordered Duke Energy Progress, LLC, to excavate all remaining coal
ash impoundments in the state.43 Cleanup costs are estimated to be in excess
of $10 billion.44
iii. Fines
Criminal prosecution of an alleged environmental violation may result in
the imposition of a fine.45 The main difference between penalties and fines
is that penalties are generally administrative or civil in nature, while fines
typically result from criminal prosecutions.46 In September 2018, “[a]
pipeline company was convicted of nine criminal charges . . . for causing the
worst California coastal spill in twenty-five years, a disaster that blackened
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-aliso-canyon-settlement-20180808-
story.html (detailing an agreement between California officials and Southern California
Gas Company resolving state agencies’ lawsuits against the utility company for releasing
over 109,000 metric tons of methane at its Aliso Canyon, California facility).
40. See id. (describing the agreement’s terms, which include millions of dollars
allocated to funding a long-term community health study and various environmental
projects to offset the methane leak’s effect on global warming).
41. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.69 (West 2019) (providing avenue for
agency enforcement in court).
42. See id.
43. See Press Release, N.C. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, DEQ Orders Duke Energy to
Excavate Coal Ash at Six Remaining Sites (Apr. 1, 2019), https://deq.nc.gov/news/press-
releases/2019/04/01/deq-orders-duke-energy-excavate-coal-ash-six-remaining-sites
(determining that North Carolina environmental law requires coal company to excavate
coal ash at all six sites in the state and dispose of it in a lined landfill).
44. See Bruce Henderson, NC Orders Duke Energy to Dig Up Millions of Tons of
Coal Ash at Six Power Plants, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 1, 2019, 9:17 PM),
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article228681894.html
(reporting that the excavation agreement could add an extra four to five billion dollars to
previously estimated cleanup costs of almost six billion).
45. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.161(3)–(6).
46. See id. § 403.161(6) (imposing both “civil penalties and criminal fines” for
noncompliance).
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popular beaches for miles, killed wildlife and hurt tourism and fishing.”47
The jury found the pipeline company “guilty of a felony count of failing to
properly maintain its pipeline and eight misdemeanor charges, including
killing marine mammals and protected sea birds.”48 The company estimated
that it spent at least $335 million in response costs and will likely face
additional large penalties and fines.49 In the British Petroleum (“BP”)
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, BP is estimated to pay up to $8.8 billion in
natural resource damages.50
III. ORDINARY ANDNECESSARY EXPENSES
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code allows businesses to deduct
“ordinary and necessary” business expenses.51 However, § 162(f) does not
allow the deduction of “any amount paid or incurred (whether by suit,
agreement, or otherwise) to, or at the direction of, a government or
governmental entity in relation to the violation of any law or the
investigation or inquiry by such government or entity into the potential
violation of any law.”52 Additionally, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017
(“TCJA”), contains provisions that may change the litigation and settlement
calculus for companies facing environmental enforcement actions.53 These
provisions also apply to certain non-governmental regulatory entities
(“NGRE”) that shall be treated as governmental entities for purposes of
§ 162.54 In order for these provisions to apply, such entities must exercise
“self-regulatory powers (including imposing sanctions) as part of performing
47. Associated Press, Pipeline Company Found Guilty in California’s Worst Coastal





50. Natural Resource Damage Assessment, ENVTL. LAW INST., http://eli-
ocean.org/gulf/nrda/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
51. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2018).
52. Id. § 162(f)(1).
53. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). The
new additions to the tax code will have a significant impact on litigation since any
environmental enforcement action related settlement agreement will now have to identify
any payment as either restitution or remediation in order to receive tax favorable
treatment. This change will force litigators to negotiate agreements with an eye towards
the tax consequences of any agreement. It will also require litigators to raise defenses
geared toward the characterization of any action addressing an environmental violation
in terms of remediation and restitution.
54. I.R.C. § 162(f)(5).
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an essential governmental function.”55
A. Fines or Penalties
In order to better understand the interplay between “ordinary and
necessary” expenses under § 162(a) and “fines or penalties” under § 162(f),
we must examine the actual wording of the statute. 26 U.S.C. § 162
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) In General. There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business . . . .
(f) Fines, Penalties, and Other Amounts
(1) In General. Except as provided in the following paragraphs of this
subsection, no deduction otherwise allowable shall be allowed under
this chapter for any amount paid or incurred (whether by suit,
agreement, or otherwise) to, or at the direction of, a government or
governmental entity in relation to the violation of any law or the
investigation or inquiry by such government or entity into the potential
violation of law.
(2) Exception for amounts constituting restitution or paid to come into
compliance with law.
(A) In General. Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any amount that–
(i) The taxpayer establishes –
(I) constitutes restitution (including remediation of
property) for damage or harm which was or may be
caused by the violation of any law or the potential
violation of any law, or
(II) is paid to come into compliance with any law
which was violated or otherwise involved in the
investigation or inquiry described in paragraph (1)
(ii) is identified as restitution or as an amount paid to come
into compliance with such law, as the case may be, in the
court order or settlement agreement, and . . .
(B) Limitation. Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any amount
paid or incurred as reimbursement to the government or entity for
the costs of any investigation or litigation.
i. Revisions to the Exception
The main changes brought about by TCJA pertain to the exceptions to the
non-deductibility of fines, penalties, and other amounts under § 162(f),
which will now require express identification of a payment as remediation
55. Id. § 162(f)(5)(B).
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or restitution,56 and clear establishment of the payment as remediation or
restitution.57 TCJA also created 26 U.S.C. § 6050X, which requires
information reporting to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) by the
affected governmental entity with respect to fines, penalties, and other
amounts.
Prior to the enactment of TCJA, violators of environmental laws and
regulations sought to characterize or structure any payments made to the
government as remediation or restitution and deduct such payments as a
business expense under § 162(a).58 The issue would usually arise after the
violator made the required tax payment, took the deduction under § 162(a),
and then the IRS challenged the deduction and sought the deficiency from
the taxpayer. In these cases, the IRS would insist that these deductions were
fines or penalties and therefore not allowed under § 162(f). The taxpayer
would argue that the payment was remediation or restitution and, as such,
qualified under the § 162(f) exception. The argument becomes more
convoluted if the person or entity made a voluntary contribution to a third
party, usually an environmental non-governmental organization, such as the
Sierra Club, and then sought a reduction of the penalty or fine in direct
proportion to the contribution made, also taking a deduction for the
contribution under § 162(a).59
Prior to the enactment of TCJA, civil payments, although labeled
“penalties,” remained deductible if imposed as a remedial measure to
compensate another party60 or if imposed to encourage prompt compliance
with a requirement of the law.61 When faced with the question of whether a
particular type of payment was for remediation or restitution, which could
56. Id. § 162(f)(2)(A)(ii).
57. Id. § 162(f)(2)(A)(i).
58. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2672, 2680 (1992)
(showing that the company deducted payments for environmental law violations as a
necessary business expense under section 162(a)).
59. See S & B Rest., Inc. v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 1226, 1233 (1980) (finding that the
deductions were valid under section 162(a) because the payments were not in response
to a violation or fine but an agreement to control the “quality and quantity of sewage
discharges”); see also Allied-Signal, Inc., 63 T.C.M. at 2681 (arguing that payments to a
third-party endowment were voluntary and thus not a fine or penalty “serv[ing] to punish
or deter the payer”).
60. Huff v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 804, 821–22 (1983) (quoting S. Pac. Transp. Co. v.
Comm’r, 75 T.C. 497, 652 (1980)) (illustrating that section 162(f), prior to the enactment
of the TCJA, “does not preclude deductions for civil penalties which is imposed to
encourage prompt compliance with a requirement of the law, or as a remedial measure
to compensate another party for expenses incurred as a result of the violation”).
61. Jenkins v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1470 (1996) (quoting Huff, 80 T.C. at
821–22).
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be deductible under § 162(a), or whether the payment was a fine or penalty,
and thus not deductible under § 162(f), courts had to engage in an often
tedious case-by-case analysis of the facts to make that determination.
However, in light of the amendments to § 162(f), this tedious analysis may
now be a moot point since, under the TCJA, a taxpayer must: (i) establish
that the payment was for remediation or restitution; and (ii) must expressly
and clearly identify the payment as such.62 Although there are no reported
cases analyzing this issue, it would appear that any payment labeled a penalty
in a court order or settlement agreement would not qualify for a deduction
even if it was imposed as a remedial measure to compensate another party.
There are instances, however, where a payment may be both a penalty and
restitution.63 In these cases, the courts try to determine which purpose the
payment was designed to serve.64 However, once again, with the enactment
of the amendments to § 162(f), this analysis should be a moot point going
forward. The taxpayer (an alleged violator) now must clearly establish that
the payment is not a penalty or a fine. If the payment is both, then
§ 162(f)(2)(A)(ii) requires the judgment or settlement agreement to identify
the portion of the payment that is a penalty or a fine.65 Additionally, under
§ 6050X, the government official involved in a suit or agreement must file a
return setting forth: (i) the amount required to be paid as a result of the suit
or agreement;66 (ii) the amount required to be paid as a result of the suit or
agreement which constitutes restitution or remediation of property;67 and (iii)
any amount required to be paid as a result of the suit or agreement for the
purpose of coming into compliance with any law that was violated or
involved in the investigation or inquiry.68 The return must be filed at the
time that the agreement is entered.69 The appropriate official must provide
the taxpayer with this information at the same time the official provides the
62. I.R.C. § 162(f)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
63. Waldman v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1384, 1387 (1987) (requiring payment of
restitution pursuant to taxpayer’s guilty plea, constituting a fine or similar penalty).
64. Id. (quoting S & B Rest., Inc., 73 T.C. at 1232) (“Where a payment ultimately
serves each of these purposes, i.e. law enforcement (nondeductible) and compensation
(deductible), our task is to determine which purpose the payment was designed to
serve.”).
65. I.R.C. § 162(f)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring a court order or settlement agreement to
identify the amount for restitution or to be paid for a business to be in compliance with
the law).
66. Id. § 6050X(a)(1)(A).
67. Id. § 6050X(a)(1)(B).
68. Id. § 6050X(a)(1)(C).
69. Id. § 6050X(a)(3).
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IRS with the information required by § 6050X(a).70 This should eliminate
most, if not all, disputes as to whether a particular payment made to the
government is deductible.71 The courts can look not only to the actual
language in a particular judgment or court order for guidance, but also at the
information return filed by the government in relation to that order or
settlement.
B. Attorney General Memorandums
It is likely that the amendment to § 162(f) and the enactment of § 6050X
are intended to help with public perception. In the past, many believed that
allowing tax deductions for those that caused environmental damage was a
subsidy for wrongdoing.72 This was particularly true when the wrongdoer
“donated” to a third party (usually an environmental non-governmental
organization) in exchange for a reduction in a penalty or imposed fine.73 The
wrongdoer would then deduct this “donation” as a necessary business
expense under § 162(a). The changes effected by TCJA work well with a
growing sentiment that settlement payments to third parties should not be
used to circumvent the non-deductibility provisions of § 162(f) and that
allowing the practice negatively impacts the impartial rule of law.74
In fact, prior to the enactment of TCJA, in a memorandum dated June 5,
2017, directed to all Component Heads and United States Attorneys (“2017
Memorandum”), the Attorney General referred unfavorably to certain
previous settlement agreements involving the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”), which included “payments to various non-governmental, third-
70. Id. § 6050X(c) (“[T]he term ‘appropriate official’ means the officer or employee
having control of the suit, investigation, or inquiry or the person appropriately designated
for purposes of this section.”).
71. See id. § 162(f)(2), (5) (stating that non-governmental regulatory entities that
“exercise self-regulating powers (including imposing sanctions) in connection with a
qualified board or exchange” or “as part of performing an essential governmental
function” will be treated as governmental agencies for the purposes of section 162(f)).
72. See Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm’r, 356 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1958) (denying a
deduction that would “thwart” state policy by “encourag[ing] continued violations” and
“increasing the odds in favor of noncompliance”).
73. See, e.g., S & B Rest., Inc. v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 1226, 1232 (1980) (holding that
a company’s monthly payments to the Pennsylvania Clean Water Fund in lieu of
prosecution for discharging sewage waste into an underground waterway are deductible
because the payments further the Clean Streams Law policy).
74. See Memorandum from Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to
ENRD Section Chiefs and Deputy Section Chiefs (Mar. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Mar. 12
Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/enrd/page/file/1043731/download (quoting
Attorney General Jeff Sessions) (“No greater good can be done for the overall health and
well-being of our Republic, than preserving and strengthening the impartial rule of
law.”).
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party organizations as a condition of settlement with the United States.”75
The Attorney General took issue with the fact that the third-party
organizations that were beneficiaries of the settlement agreements were
neither victims nor parties to the lawsuits.76 The 2017 Memorandum
indicated that the DOJ would no longer engage in this practice.77 The 2017
Memorandumwent on to indicate that, effective immediately, DOJ attorneys
could not enter into any agreement on behalf of the United States in
settlement of federal claims or charges, including agreements settling civil
litigation, accepting plea agreements, or deferring or declining prosecution
in a criminal matter, that directed or provided for a payment or loan to any
non-governmental person or entity that was not a party to the dispute.78
However, the 2017 Memorandum did provide for three limited exceptions:
(i) a “lawful payment or loan that provides restitution to a victim or that
otherwise directly remedies the harm that is sought to be redressed,
including, for example, harm to the environment”; (ii) “payments for legal
or other professional services rendered in connection with the case”; and (iii)
“payments expressly authorized by statute, including restitution and
forfeiture.”79
On January 9, 2018, just after the implementation of TCJA, the acting
Assistant Attorney General circulated a memorandum to Section Chiefs and
Deputy Assistant Attorneys at ENRD (“ENRD Memorandum”).80 The
purpose of the ENRDMemorandum was to provide guidance concerning the
application of the 2017 Memorandum, in particular as it pertained to
environmental cases. The ENRD Memorandum made it clear that the
Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”) must approve any provision that
contains a payment to a third party under the limited exceptions set forth in
the 2017 Memorandum before it becomes a part of an ENRD agreement or
decree.81 The ENRD Memorandum expressly prohibited any third-party
payment that could serve as an offset or otherwise allow any reduction in the
civil or criminal monetary penalties.82
75. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jeff Sessions to All Component Heads and






80. Memorandum from Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to ENRD
Deputy Assistant Attorneys Gen. and Section Chiefs (Jan. 9, 2018) [hereinafter ENRD
Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/enrd/page/file/1043726/download.
81. Id. at 1.
82. Id. at 2.
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The ENRDMemorandum clarified one of the limited exceptions regarding
payment to third parties listed in the 2017 Memorandum that allowed
payments to third parties that “directly remed[y] the harm that is sought to
be redressed” in the action, “including, for example, harm to the
environment.”83 The ENRD Memorandum suggests that in limited
circumstances, studies of the environmental harm caused by the violations
that are the subject matter of the underlying litigation may be included in a
plan intended to remedy the environmental harm, even if the study is
performed by a non-governmental third-party.84 The ENRD Memorandum
further provides that a third-party payment provision must include “specific
requirements to ensure that the payment will directly remedy the harm that
is sought to be redressed.”85 The ENRD Memorandum goes on to provide
examples of acceptable third-party payments.86
The March 12, 2018, memorandum from the acting Assistant Attorney
General to the Section Chiefs and Deputy Section Chiefs of the ENRD
(“Priority Memorandum”) should be of interest to all environmental law
practitioners.87 The Priority Memorandum sets forth the ENRD’s
enforcement principles and priorities.88 Of interest is the first enforcement
priority to which ENRD should give “particular attention and dedication of
resources within the Division.”89 That first priority is a focus on protecting
clean water, clean air, and clean land.90 The Priority Memorandum directs
ENRD to “prioritize enforcement actions that provide concrete
environmental benefits for clean water, clean air, and clean land.”91 Cases
under this designation arise mainly under CERCLA, the Oil Pollution Act,
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean
Water Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act.92 The Priority Memorandum
further provides that where referring agencies (such as the EPA) prioritize
83. Id. (quoting June 5 Memorandum, supra note 75).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 3 (“A provision stating in general terms that monies that will fund habitat
improvements by a particular third-party organization do not contain sufficient
specificity to ensure that the standard is met.”).
86. See id. at 3–5 (listing that “an appropriate third-party payment would:” (1)
“directly remedy harm to affected bodies of water”; (2) “support cleanup of pollution
from the body of water”; and (3) be a “lawful payment that directly remedies the same
kind of harm” in cases involving stationary source pollution).
87. SeeMar. 12 Memorandum, supra note 74.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 9.
90. Id. at 9–10.
91. Id. at 9.
92. See id.
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these types of violations, ENRD will likewise seek to pursue them.93 As
such, in the near future we are likely to see more civil lawsuits and criminal
prosecutions under these Acts. This makes understanding the amendments
to § 162(f) even more critical and time-sensitive.
C. Transitional Guidelines
To better understand the amendments to § 162(f) and the enactment of §
6050X, it is important to understand how they are to be implemented. In the
April 9, 2018, Internal Revenue Bulletin, the IRS provided transitional
guidance under §§ 162(f) and 6050X with respect to certain fines and
penalties.94 As of this writing, the Department of the Treasury and the IRS
are yet to publish proposed regulations regarding these sections of the
Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the transitional guidelines remain the only
source for direction.
The most important factor under the transitional guidelines is that
reporting under § 6050X will not be required until the date specified in the
proposed regulations and in no case earlier than the date of publication of the
proposed regulations.95 Reporting will not be required with respect to
amounts to be paid under a binding court order or agreement entered into
before the date specified in the proposed regulations.96 As of the date of this
writing, the proposed regulations are yet to be published, and there are no
reporting requirements under § 6050X in the meantime.97 However, a
careful practitioner should be on the lookout for the date of publication of
the proposed regulations. Although it is the government official that must
file the return, the taxpayer must be provided with a copy of the return at the
same time it is filed with the IRS.98
On the other hand, the requirements of § 162(f) must be complied with
immediately. The identification requirement found in § 162(f)(2)(A)(ii)
applies to any amount paid or incurred after December 22, 2017, unless the
amounts were paid or incurred under a binding order or agreement that was
entered into before that date.99 Until proposed regulations under § 162(f) are
93. Id. at 10.
94. See Rev. Proc. 2018-23, 2018–15 I.R.B. 474 [hereinafter I.R.S. Bulletin]
(providing transitional guidance under sections 162(f) and 6050X to help with new
regulations).
95. See id. at 476.
96. Id.
97. See id.; 2018–2019 Priority Guidance Plan, INTERNALREVENUE SERVICE (Nov.
8, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2018-2019_pgp_initial.pdf.
98. General Instructions for Certain Information Returns (2019), INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1099gi (last visited Feb. 12, 2020).
99. I.R.S. Bulletin, supra note 94, at 475.
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issued, the identification requirement in § 162(f)(2)(A)(ii) is satisfied for a
specific amount if the settlement agreement or court order specifically states
that the amount is for restitution, remediation, or for coming into compliance
with the law.100 Satisfying the identification requirement of
§ 162(f)(2)(A)(ii) does not automatically satisfy the establishment
requirement of § 162(f)(2)(A)(i).101 This aspect will require additional
guidance, including clarifying what would satisfy the establishment
requirement, which is not addressed by the transitional guidance. The
proposed regulations will amend and add sections to the Income Tax
Regulations as it pertains to §§ 162(f) and 6050X. The regulations should
provide additional assistance in determining how a taxpayer establishes that
a payment is for remediation or restitution and thus may be deductible under
§ 162(a).102
Even though the transitional guidelines do not provide any direction as to
how a taxpayer must establish that a payment is for remediation or
restitution, there is no reason to believe that the standard will be any different
than in the past. Prior to the enactment of TCJA, a taxpayer that settled an
environmental action by making a payment to the government was required
to prove that the payment that it sought to deduct as an ordinary business
expense under § 162(a) was for remediation or allowable restitution. The
main question that the courts have asked when faced with a restitution
payment is whether the payment was punitive.103 If it was, the deduction
could be barred; if it was not, then the court must ask whether the payment
is an otherwise ordinary and necessary expense of the taxpayer’s business.104
This is necessarily a factual determination that can only be made on a case-
by-case basis. Presumably, the establishment requirement of
§ 162(f)(2)(A)(i) will require a similar analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
From a practical perspective, it is imperative that an alleged violator seek
immediate counsel. To the extent possible, the alleged violator, whether in
a civil or criminal proceeding, should attempt to reach a settlement
agreement with the governmental entity pursuing the violation. In so doing,
100. Id. at 476.
101. Id. at 475.
102. See id. at 475–76.
103. Cavaretta v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010–004 10 (2010) (analyzing the question
of whether restitution payments were deductible and explaining that if the payments were
punitive, “the deduction may be barred”).
104. See id. at 13 (recognizing that payments made pursuant to the settlement of a
third-party claim can be tax-deductible).
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it is imperative from a tax perspective to negotiate the characterization of
payments as remediation or restitution that is not punitive in nature.
However, such characterization must not be illusory, but actual in nature.
For example, it is not enough to merely characterize a particular payment as
being for remediation or restitution. The payment must be inextricably tied
to actual remediation or restitution efforts. In this regard, substance prevails
over form.105
To the extent payments are made to third party non-governmental entities,
it becomes even more important for the alleged violator to be able to
demonstrate a specific reason or benefit for paying the third party for any
remediation or restitution efforts. For example, mitigation or restoration of
destroyed wetlands may be accomplished by purchasing the right to record
conservation easements in mitigation banks. Governmental entities
generally do not want the responsibility of maintaining conservation areas.
Instead, conservation easements are often granted to non-governmental
organizations willing to take on the responsibility.106 Additionally, in light
of recent ENRC policy disfavoring payments to third parties by alleged
violators, the party in alleged violation of environmental laws must obtain
an ENRC AAG approval prior to entering into any settlement agreement
requiring such payment, if it intends to claim a deduction under § 162(a) for
such payment.107
105. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468, 470 (1935) (holding that although
certain transactions pursuant to a corporate reorganization are not taxable under the
Revenue Act of 1928, when a holistic view of a company’s reorganization plainly reveals
that its efforts were for the sole purpose of avoiding tax liability, the substantive actions
of the company determine which tax provisions apply).
106. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06(3) (West 2019) (“Conservation easements
may be acquired by any governmental body or agency or by a charitable corporation or
trust whose purposes include protecting natural, scenic, or open space values of real
property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open space use,
protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving
sites or properties of historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural significance.”);









imumPages=1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL (last visited Feb. 18, 2020)
(explaining that land trusts can employ “more flexible and creative” conservation
techniques than public agencies).
107. See ENRD Memorandum, supra note 80.
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Once a settlement is reached, the alleged violator must ensure that the
written settlement agreement expressly and unequivocally identifies any
remediation or restitution payment as such. To the extent that the
governmental agency imposes penalties or fines, in addition to remediation
or restitution, the payment must be broken down by category, so that there is
no question as to what portion of the payment is for remediation or
restitution, as opposed to a penalty or fine. As it pertains to restitution, the
agreement should clearly express that the restitution is not punitive in nature.
The clearer the agreement, the more likely it is that the alleged violator will
be able to comply with § 162(f) and deduct all or part of the payment as an
ordinary and necessary business expense under § 162(a).
To the extent that an agreement cannot be reached and the case proceeds
to trial, the substance of any court order or final judgment takes on added
significance. Courts have held that the critical difference between a fine or
similar penalty is whether the payment is voluntary.108 By its very nature,
any court-ordered payment is not voluntary. “At the very least, a ‘voluntary’
payment must be one made without expectation of a quid pro quo from the
court.”109 Thus, any pro-rata reduction in a fine or penalty as a result of
remediation or restitution would likely not be voluntary. However, to the
extent that the judge orders remediation, restitution, or requires a payment
that is remedial in nature, such payment should be expressly and clearly
identified as such in the order. Any such payments should be itemized or set
apart from the portion of the payment that is a penalty, a fine, or is meant to
punish or deter certain conduct. If the judge is not explicit in itemizing the
payment in the ruling, the alleged violator must seek clarification and ask the
court to separate any required payment into its compensatory and punitive
components.110
Until the Treasury Department and the IRS issue regulations to clarify and
provide further guidance pertaining to §§ 162(f) and 6050X, practitioners
should continue to abide by the IRS transitional guidelines. If an entity is
108. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2672, 2681–82 (1992)
(recognizing that a restitution payment made with a “virtual guarantee” that the
associated criminal fine would be commensurately reduced is not voluntary and therefore
may not be deducted as a legal or professional expense on a federal income tax return).
109. Id. at 2681 (holding a contribution to an environmental endowment fund that is
made with the clear expectation of a reduced criminal fine is not voluntary).
110. See, e.g., VA. CODEANN. § 8.01–576.11 (2019) (stating that “upon request of all
parties and consistent with law and public policy, the court shall incorporate” the terms
of a settlement agreement into the final decree of the case). Many judges, particularly in
civil proceedings, will allow the parties to submit an agreed upon order, or if an
agreement cannot be reached, submit competing orders. If such is the case, then the
alleged violator should be careful to clearly identify and itemize each portion of the
required payment.
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entering into a settlement agreement with the government for the alleged
violation of environmental laws or regulations, it should pay particular
attention to strict compliance with § 162(f)’s establishment and identification
requirements. Failure to do so will preclude the alleged violator from being
able to deduct any payments made pursuant to the settlement agreement.
